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Warships intensifying hunt for pirates at sea, but pirate bosses on land remain elusive

ABOARD THE CARLSKRONA (AP) - Aboard a dingy and a helicopter, Swedish special forces head out from the warship Carlskrona to search for Somali pirates.

But while the European Union Naval Force is more actively hunting pirates than ever before on the high seas, their financiers and organizers remain out of reach on land. Officials complain that not enough is being done to gather intelligence on them and their assets even as law enforcement agencies cite problems with coordinating the collection of information and legal barriers in sharing it.

As piracy off East Africa continues unabated -- with 84 ships attacked this year as of early June and 24 of them seized -- frustration is growing in the shipping industry.

Per Gullestrup, the CEO of Denmark`s Clipper Group, says it has a wealth of information that is not being used or collected by anti-piracy forces. Clipper Group is believed to be the first company to use European courts to file blackmail and extortion charges against pirates.

“We have DNA evidence, records of phone calls, the serial numbers from the notes we delivered in ransom ... but there is no centralized effort to collect information,” Gullestrup said. Some companies have photos of pirates` faces from CCTV or pictures taken by the crew, he added, but no one had asked for the information.

Pierre St Hilaire from Interpol`s anti-piracy task force said it must wait for national police forces to volunteer information which could then be included in an album containing photos of nearly 200 individuals and fingerprints for about half. The album is designed for navies who stop and search suspected pirate vessels but not everyone has access to the album, partly because Interpol must get permission from each member state that supplied the information to share it, St Hilaire said.

In the meantime, there is currently no reliable way to check if men stopped and searched on the high seas are wanted for a previous hijacking, said the commander of the EU Naval Force.

“Ships will often see men on board skiffs throwing ladders and weapons overboard as we approach to board and search them,” Rear Adm. Jan Thornqvist said in an interview aboard the warship Carlskrona last month. “In the ideal world, we could run these through a database and see if any of the men was wanted for anything.”

The EU naval force has begun trying to gather some evidence when it stops suspected pirates, but so far it is mostly limited to photographs and fingerprints of the men at sea, said Jens Lindstrom, the EU force`s legal expert.

“Militaries are trained to win wars, not trials,” said Lindstrom. “At the moment there`s very little risk for the pirates once the ransom has been paid.”

Even if the pirate bosses can be identified and a case built against them, the problem of arresting and extraditing them remains. Interpol says the police force of each country that has a ship hijacked is responsible for gathering evidence against pirates. Somalia is a failed state without a central government since 1991.

The war on piracy must start on land

One of the six suspected Somali pirates wait in a holding cell before they appeared in a Mombasa court on charges of piracy, Wednesday, April 28, 2010, in Mombasa, Kenya. Their case was adjourned until May 5, 2010 .

 

How is it possible that pirates from very poor Somalia can hold to ransom ships from some of the richest countries, despite the patrolling by the world`s strongest navies?

That was the dilemma discussed at the recent Istanbul Conference on Somalia, and is high on the agenda of the United Nations, NATO and the European Union.

The current anti-piracy strategy has worked well, but it is facing diminishing returns. Naval patrols off the Horn of Africa have reduced the success rate of attacks: 1 in 10 attempts succeed now, compared to 1 in 3 before. Yet the number of (reported) attacks doubled between 2007 and 2008 from 51 to 111, and doubled again in 2009 to 217. They are still on the increase.

Five years ago, most attacks were along the Somali coast; now some are carried out 1,000 miles offshore. The average ransom used to be a few thousand dollars; it has skyrocketed to $2-3 million and rising. Somali piracy will again earn about $100 million this year.

Navies from around the world protect vessels off the costs of Somalia. Is that working? To an extent yes, but at an exorbitant cost. A vessel patrolling off Somalia costs $100,000 a day. Considering that there are more than 40 vessels out on patrol, the aggregate annual operational cost is about $1.5 billion, compared to the $3 million paid into an anti-piracy trust fund especially created by the United Nations.

The effects on rich countries` economy has been negligible, as insurance rates have increased only minimally. But the impact of piracy on East Africa is devastating: It endangers lives, curbs trade, kills tourism, steals food aid, enriches criminals, funds insurgents and perverts the regional economy. The disruption has now moved to Great Lakes states that use East African ports for trade.

What can be done?

Letting the pirates go makes no sense: They are back in the water within a week (600 so far have been released following confiscation of their weapons). Shooting them on sight is fundamentally wrong (although it has happened, including recently). Transporting them to countries that own the seized vessels is impractical, given the distance and jurisdictional complexities. What else?

Patrolling off the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean must continue, and seized pirates must be brought to trial in the region: Kenya currently holds 124 pirates, the Seychelles 31 (which is 10 percent of their prison population). More pirates should, and can be tried in other countries in East Africa.

Further international assistance is therefore needed to strengthen the capacity of countries in the region — training prosecutors, refurbishing courts and prisons. This can have wider benefits: It can help police in the Horn of Africa combat drug trafficking (30-35 tons a year from Afghanistan alone), and the smuggling of guns, people, resources and electronics.

Most of all, the problem must be tackled at its source. Somalia is a high-risk environment, but not all of it is completely anarchic. In provinces such as Somaliland and Puntland, authorities have some control. They should be assisted, technically and financially, to build institutional and logistical infrastructures — coast guards, police, courts — to enforce the anti-piracy law on land.

They should also be assisted with social and economic programs to reconstruct the country and especially to provide jobs to young men otherwise vulnerable to crime.

To begin with — and this is the easy part — Somali prisons should be refurbished to enable Somali pirates to serve their sentences on home soil — even sentences imposed abroad.

Next, the judicial system in Somalia`s provinces where security has improved should be strengthened to the point (not far at all) that it can try its own pirates.

Above all, robust anti-money laundering measures are needed. Each pirate takes home $10-15,000 per successful raid. Their skiffs, in an attack formation, hold 20 to 24 pirates, which collectively amounts to $300,000 to $500,000 per attack.

Given ransom payments of a few million dollars per ship, the difference makes the criminal groups the big winners. In other words, piracy has become an increasingly profitable business — insurance companies do not mind paying a few million dollars for the ransom of a tanker whose temporary disability in the hands of pirates would cost as much per week.

It`s time to adapt the international strategy in Somalia to new conditions — dealing with the problem at its source, on land, rather than at sea.

Until a solution is found in Somalia, the pirates will keep coming.

*Antonio Maria Costa is executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

© 2010 The New York Times Company. All Rights Reserved.

NATO, EU say reacting to rising Somali pirate numbers
By Peter Apps, Political Risk Correspondent
June 08, 2010

NORTHWOOD HEADQUARTERS, England, June 8 (Reuters) - More Somali pirates have taken to the water this year than ever before, NATO and EU forces said on Tuesday, but navies are combating them more effectively.

The Islamist takeover of a pirate haven last month seems to have had no impact on what has become a very profitable industry, they said, but monsoon conditions meant attacks would now fall sharply until September.

Alongside emerging powers such as China, India and Russia, NATO and the European Union have sent taskforces to combat piracy -- a move they believe has made the chokepoints around the Gulf of Aden much safer but pushed the problem into the wider Indian Ocean.

Currently, pirates hold 17 ships anchored at locations along the Somali coast and 357 sailors.

“We would say there has been a threefold increase in the number of pirates since 2009,” Rear Admiral Peter Hudson, commander of the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR), told a briefing at his headquarters northwest of London. “I would say we are being more effective but against an increased level of threat.”

Naval forces disrupted 59 pirate groupings in the Somali basin between March and May, one of the two main piracy seasons of the year, up sharply from last year.

That could range from arresting the pirates, destroying their boats and putting them on trial in Kenya or the Seychelles to simply forcing them to throw ladders and weapons overboard and begin the long journey back to Somalia.

“A lot of it comes down to the balance of risk and reward for the pirates,” Hudson said. “The risks are very great -- not just of being caught, but all boats being overturned or dying in bad weather -- but the potential rewards are also very large .”

NO ISLAMIST CRACKDOWN

European, Russian and forces from Somalia`s semi-autonomous Puntland have all stormed ships to recapture them from pirates in recent months, but Hudson said that was not always an option.

“It depends on a variety of issues -- risk of damage to the ship, cargo, environmental impact with something like a tanker and most of all the safety of the crew,” he said.

Somalia`s Islamists have usually taken a tough line on piracy, almost eradicating it when they briefly ran Somalia in 2006-7. But their takeover of the haven of Haradheere in May did not seem to have produced any such clampdown, NATO said.

“There were three pirated ships anchored off Haradheere when the Islamists took over in May and they are still there,” said NATO force deputy chief of staff Hans Henselth. “That tells me that they are not taking any action against the pirates.”

There had also been an increase in attacks launched from Islamist-controlled areas of the Somali coast, the officers said, but without any land-based operations they simply could not tell if the Islamists were directly involved in piracy.

NATO`s Henselth said most hijackings had been of relatively ill-prepared cheaply run merchant ships failing to take advice on self protection measures and routing.

“It would not matter so much except these ships are still generating ransoms, funding piracy and making it worse for everyone else,” he said.

Piracy would only ultimately subside when greater rule of law returned to Somalia, Hudson said.

“The answer to this is not charging around the Indian Ocean with expensive destroyers,” he said. “It has to be a Somalia-based solution on land.”

Hungary and Slovakia Begin Citizenship Tug of War

Representatives of the Hungarian Parliament sing the national anthem on May 14, during the re-formation of Hungarian Parliament. A Hungarian nationality law passed on May 26 grants any ethic Hungarian living in any country citizenship. (Attila Kisbenedek/Getty Images)

BRATISLAVA, Slovakia—A unique battle for citizenship has erupted between Slovakia and Hungary, as both countries go at it through the passing of laws.

A controversial law passed last week by Hungarian leaders can grant citizenship to ethic Hungarians living in any country. In response, Slovakia passed a law restricting dual citizenship and making it so that any Slovakian citizen who knowingly applies for citizenship in another country will be stripped of their Slovakian citizenship.

The Hungarian nationality law was passed on May 26 by the newly elected Parliament, which has the nationalist Fidesz Party as the majority. Under the new law, any ethic Hungarian living in any country can be granted citizenship if they can demonstrate knowledge of the Hungarian language and proof of their ancestry.

With up to 10 percent of Slovakia made up of ethnic Hungarians—mostly located in the southern part of the country where the two countries meet—most Slovak politicians assessed the new law as a security threat, with some of them labeling it a direct provocation.

There are historically border issues between Slovakia and Hungary. After the first world war, the Treaty of Trianon was signed that divided the Austro-Hungarian Empire and cost Hungary 72 percent of its territory.

The recent law is generally regarded by Slovakians as a first step to increase the influence of Hungary abroad, with potential claims of autonomy or revision of the Treaty of Trianon.

The Slovakian Parliament was unusually swift in passing a counter law.

The harsh laws, which can revoke the citizenship of Slovakians may have been a bit hasty. Informal research by local media in Slovakia showed that most Hungarians are not interested in applying for Hungarian citizenship. However, some analysts warned that the move will effectively decrease the number of Slovakian citizens.

Some critics questioned whether the new law is unconstitutional, since the Slovakian Constitution guarantees that no one can loose their citizenship against their will.

Relations between Hungary and Slovakia, both members of the EU and NATO, and located next to each other in the middle of Europe, have been largely peaceful since the second world war. There have only been slight exceptions to the good relations—falling on the shoulders of top politicians from both countries from national parties, which were formed after the fall of communism in 1989.

The exchange of threatening words between national party leaders has won them points in their own countries and has been the fire behind their campaigns.

On June 12, long-awaited parliamentary elections will be held in Slovakia. By then, it will be seen how many political points the Slovakian nationalist party gained in their recent move.

The Nationality Law of Bhutan, 1958

Having found it necessary to amend this law relating to the acquisition and deprivation of citizenship which has been in force till date, His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo, in accordance with the suggestions put up by the Royal Advisors, People and the Monastic Body, is pleased to incorporate the following changes:

1. This law may be called the Nationality Law of Bhutan, 1958 and shall be effective throughout the Kingdom of Bhutan.
   
2. This law shall be in force throughout the Kingdom of Bhutan from the day of its enactment.
   
3. Any person can become a Bhutanese National
   

1. If his/her father is a Bhutanese National and is a resident of the Kingdom of Bhutan; or
   
2. If any person s born within or outside Bhutan after the commencement of this law provided the previous father is a Bhutanese National at the time of his/her birth.
   
4. (1) If any foreigner who has reached the age of majority and is otherwise eligible, presents a petition to an official appointed by His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo and takes an oath of loyalty according to the rules laid down by the official, he any be enrolled as a Bhutanese National, provided that:–
   
   1. The person is a resident of the Kingdom of Bhutan for more than ten years; and
      
   2. Owns agricultural land within the Kingdom of Bhutan.
      

(2) If a woman, married to a Bhutanese National, submits a petition and takes the oath of loyalty as stated above to the satisfaction of the official, and provided that she has reached the age of majority and is otherwise eligible, her name may be enrolled as a Bhutanese National. (3) If any person has been deprived o his Bhutanese Nationality or has renounced his Bhutanese Nationality or forfeited his Bhutanese Nationality, the person cannot become a Bhutanese National again unless His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo grants approval to do so.

5. (1) If any foreigner submits a petition to His Majesty the Druk Gayalpo according to the rules described in the above sections, and provided the person ahs reached the age of majority and is otherwise eligible, and has served satisfactorily in government service for at least five years ad has been residing in the Kingdom of Bhutan for at least 10 years, he mat receive a Bhutanese Nationality Certificate. Once the Certificate is received, such a person has to take the oath of loyalty according to rules laid down by the Government and from that day onwards, his name will be enrolled as a Bhutanese National
   
(2) Any foreigner who has reached the age of majority and is otherwise eligible, can receive a Nationality Certificate provided that in the opinion of His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo his conduct and his service as a Government servant is satisfactory.
6. Any person who:–
   

1. becomes a national of a foreign country and resides in the country; or
   
2. has renounced Bhutanese Nationality and settled in a foreign country; or
   
3. claims to be a citizen of a foreign country or pledges an oath of loyalty to that country; or
   
4. is registered as a Bhutanese National but has left his agricultural land or has stopped residing in the Kingdom; or
   
5. being a bonafide national has stopped residing in the country or fails to observe the laws of the Kingdom:
   

Shall forfeit his Bhutanese Nationality.

7. (1) If a Nationality Certificate has been obtained on presentation of false information or wrong facts or omission of facts, the Government may order the Certificate to be cancelled.
   
   (2) (a) If any citizen or national, engages in activities against His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo or speaks against His Majesty, or the people of Bhutan; or
   
   (b)When Bhutan and India is engaged in a war with some other country if any citizen or national of Bhutan is found indulging in business, correspondence or helping the enemies; or
   

(c) If any person within a period of five years from the day when he was enlisted as a Bhutanese National, if imprisoned in any country for more than one year, the person is liable to be deprived of his Bhutanese Nationality without prior notice.

8. To implement this law, His majesty the Druk Gyalpo may incorporate additional rules if necessary.
   

BRITISH NATIONALITY LAW AND THE HISTORY OF NATURALISATION

The history of the law of British, or English nationality offers many curious and puzzling problems. In the first place, much difficulty arises in connection with the concept of allegiance, which remained the basis of the law even after the introduction of a more or less complete statutory scheme of nationality and which may still influence the interpretation of the latest statutory formulation, though in that the concept has been formally abandoned. That concept was elaborated in Calvin’s Case, the essence of the decision in which was « One King, one allegiance ». The application of this doctrine resulted, perhaps paradoxically, in the holding that the Scots antenati were not subjects, though the postnati were. But the paradox is explained if account is taken of the further rule that a man’s allegiance is determined for all time at his birth. This was why the English and the Scots postnati had to be fellow-subjects: they were born under the allegiance of the same King. It was also why both English and Scots antenati could not be fellow-subjects to each other: they had been born under different allegiances. It seems to have involved the assumption, as a principle of politics if not of law, that the Scottish personal union could never be dissolved. Yet in view of the departure from the common law rules as to the descent of the Crown made in the Acts of Settlement the English and Scottish crowns might! have divided again — and in [*4] fact nearly did so. Coke clearly regarded this possibility as « less than a dream of a shadow, or a shadow of a dream », and was therefore prepared to apply uncritically to such an academic situation a rule of Bracton’s, designed for the quite different case of a tenant by military service with two warring feudal lords. Such a man would be ad fidem utriusque and so Coke would have had a Scot after the division of the crowns a double national. Was he not snatching at any argument which would have the desireable effect of nullifying the refusal of Parliament to weld the two Kingdoms into one by legislative means?. His thesis was in any event suitable only to an age in which the sovereign had something of a monopoly of government and in which a personal union of crowns therefore did produce a virtual merger of Kingdoms and governments. It would have been intolerable in modern time in the event, for instance that the constitutional crown of the Netherlands should descend to the wearer of the constitutional crown of Britain. Dutch and British government would remain in such a case distinct and the fortuitous coincidence of royal titles would afford no justification for a merger of nation[*5]alities. The upshot of the decision in Isaacson v. Durant, in which it was held that Hanoverians born before the dissolution of the union of the British and Hanoverian crowns in one person were not thereafter British subjects, that allegiance is owed to the sovereign « in his politic capacity », is therefore to be approved. The reasoning behind that decision is, however, open to criticism. For the main consideration was that, if the union of nationalities was to depend on the fortuitous union of crowns, no man would, as it were, know where he stood from hour to hour. But that, it has been said, is exactly the case where annexation or cession of territory is involved: an inhabitant of the territory affected becomes or ceases to he a subject on the instant save insofar as an Order in Council or a treaty may make some concession to his convenience. A distinction may indeed be held to exist here: the annexation of territory necessarily brings that territory under the sway of the legislative, or at least of the executive power and a union of nationalities is therefore justifiable if not necessary, whereas a casual personal union of crowns implies no such result. But perhaps the assumptions of the debate are in any event unsound. How is it that the question of the status of Hanoverians never arose until 1886?

But the transmutation of the concept of allegiance is not the only problem of this part of the law. Another, equally curious, is that of the status of the ius sanguinis. Was the statute De Natis ultra Mareof 1351 declaratory of the common law or was it enacting? In either case why, if that statute confirmed or provided that foreign-born children of English parents were subjects, was it necessary for another enactment in 1708 to go over the same ground? And what did the two statutes mean? Did they cover the case where only one parent was a subject as was thought upon De Natis in the seventeenth centurybut as was denied by both Parliament and Courts upon the Act of Anne in the century following?

Further in connection with the jus sanguinis, did the statute operate to the uttermost generation, as Bacon thought upon De Natis when he said « Nay, if a man look narrowly into the law on this point, he shall find a consequence that may seem at first strange, but yet cannot well be avoided; which is, that if divers families of English men and women plant themselves at Middleborough or at Roan [Rouen], or at Lisbon, and have issue, and their issue do intermarry among themselves, without intermixture of foreign blood, such descendents are naturalised to all generations; for every generation is of liege parents... . And if he was right, why in De Geer v Stone was there accepted the concept of the statutory subject, a mule-like creature who was yet a subject but who had no hope of posterity? Did the British Nationality Act of 1772 extend the concession of nationality to the second foreign-born generation in the male line or did the eighteenth century legislation cut down an earlier and more liberal rule? How is it that « a sort of hereditary doubt » surrounds the question of acquisition of nationality by descent?

In the final analysis the question in any nationality case is whether a person is a subject or an alien. He may be the former because born within the dominions of the sovereign or Crown in virtue, that is to say, of the general presumption that the allegiance is co-extensive with those dominions, or in virtue of the jus soli. Or he may be such by descent — because born of liege parents, or iure sanguinis. And the principles of the jus soli and the jus sanguinis do not stand opposed to one another. In most legal systems they are to be found intertwined, each supplying the limitations of the other. But the degree to which one or the other has been emphasised at any time may well have varied. Considering the complexity of the problems described, this would seem to have been very likely the case and to account for the difficulty which exists in finding ready solutions for them. There exists, however, one approach to them which has not hitherto been much employed but which, though it has its limitations, is an obviously useful one. This is to test the rules relating to the acquisition and loss of the status of a subject by reference to the categories of persons who sought to have that status conferred upon them by ad hoc legislative or executive action and who therefore must have been looked on as not already being subjects. Let it be seen, in short, who was naturalised or endenized from time to time; from that enquiry it should emerge e contrario who was taken to be a subject. It is the main purpose of this paper to push such an enquiry as far as it can be taken on the basis of the records already printed or calendared. A subsidiary purpose is to attempt to throw some light on the history of naturalization considered by itself, and to revive some forgotten learning on the law of nationality in general.

Nationality Law, 1959

Original Kuwaiti nationals are those persons who were settled in Kuwait prior to 1920 and who maintained their normal residence there until the date of the publication of this Law. Ancestral residence shall be deemed complementary to the period of residence of descendants.
A person is deemed to have maintained his normal residence in Kuwait even if he resides in a foreign country if he has the intention of returning to Kuwait.

Any person born in, or outside, Kuwait whose father is a Kuwaiti national shall be a Kuwaiti national himself.


Kuwaiti nationality is acquired by any person born in Kuwait whose parents are unknown. A foundling is deemed to have been born in Kuwait unless the contrary is proved.
Kuwaiti nationality may be granted by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior to any person [upon his attaining his majority who was] born in, or outside, Kuwait to a Kuwaiti mother whose father is unknown or whose kinship to his father has not been legally established. The Minister of the Interior may afford to such children, being minors, the same treatment as that afforded to Kuwaiti nationals until they reach their majority.

Kuwaiti nationality may be granted by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior to any person of full age satisfying the following conditions:
1.   that he has lawfully resided in Kuwait for at least 20 consecutive years or for at least 15 consecutive years if he is an Arab belonging to an Arab country. The requirement of consecutive residence shall not be affected if the applicant leaves Kuwait on official business. If he leaves for a reason other than that of official business, but retains the intention of returning, the period spent abroad shall be deducted from the total period of his residence in Kuwait;
2.   that he has lawful means of earning his living, is of good character and has not been convicted of an honour-related crime or of an honesty-related crime;
3.   that he has knowledge of the Arabic language;
4.   that he possesses qualifications or renders services needed in Kuwait;
5.   that he be an original Muslim by birth, or that he has converted to Islam according to the prescribed rules and procedures and that a period of at least 5 years has passed since he embraced Islam before the grant of naturalization. Nationality thus acquired is ipso facto lost and the Decree of naturalization rendered void ab initio if the naturalized person expressly renounces Islam or if he behaves in such a manner as clearly indicates his intention to abandon Islam. In any such case, the nationality of any dependant of the apostate who had acquired it upon the naturalization of the apostate is also rendered void.
A Committee of Kuwaiti nationals, appointed by the Minister of the Interior, shall select from those who apply for naturalization, the applicants whom it recommends for naturalization in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
The number of persons who may be naturalized in any one year in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be decided by an Act.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the immediately preceding Article, the following may be granted Kuwaiti nationality by Decree, upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior:
1.   any person who has rendered valuable services to Kuwait;
2.   any person [upon his attaining his majority who was] born to a Kuwaiti mother and who has maintained his residence [in Kuwait] until reaching the age of majority and whose foreign father has irrevocably divorced his mother or has died. The Minister of the Interior may afford to such children, being minors, the same treatment as that afforded to Kuwaiti nationals in all respects until they reach the age of majority;
3.   an Arab belonging to an Arab country provided that he had resided in Kuwait since before 1945 and has maintained his residence there until the promulgation of the Decree providing for his naturalization;
4.   a non-Arab provided that he had resided in Kuwait since before 1930 and has maintained his residence there until the promulgation of the Decree providing for his naturalization. Ancestral residence shall be deemed complementary to the period of residence of descendants for the purposes of the application of the third and fourth paragraphs of this Article, provided that the descendant was born in and is residing in Kuwait. Proof of residence shall be effected according to the procedure prescribed by Article 21 of this Law.
The number of persons who may be naturalized in any one year in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article shall be decided by an Act.
The grant of Kuwaiti nationality in virtue of the provisions of this Article shall be further subject to the conditions laid down in paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the Article immediately preceding.


A person who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of any of Articles 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of this Law shall not have the right to vote in any Parliamentary election within 30 years following the date of his naturalization. The provisions of this Article shall apply to any who have already acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of naturalization prior to the enactment of this amendment. The 30 year period shall be deemed to start to run in the case of such persons from 6 July 1966.
A person to whom this Article applies shall not have the right to stand as a candidate for or to be appointed to membership of any Parliamentary body.